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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOLe. 39

SURROGATE'S COURT

Surrogate's Court allows running of sixty days before entertaining
petition under Section 211-b of the Surrogate's Court Act.
In re Unseld's Estate 318 involved a proceeding by an executrix
under Section 211-b of the Surrogate's Court Act. This section
provides that whenever an executor or administrator has reason to
question the validity of a claim, and no action to enforce the claim
has been instituted and the estate has sufficient assets to permit
payment of the claim in full, the executor or administrator may
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cited to show cause why his claim should not be disallowed. Section 211-c, however, enables the claimant to commence an ordinary
action at law or equity on the claim, provided that where his claim
has been presented and rejected, such action must be commenced
within sixty days after the rejection. Both sections, 211-b and
211-c, were added in 1963 and became effective March 1, 1964.
In this case, the claim was presented on April 2, 1964 and rejected
on April 20, 1964. The court reasoned that since the claimant
had sixty days from the date of rejection to commence an action
at law or in equity on the claim, the personal representative should
not be permitted to utilize the show-cause procedure (of § 211-b)
in the surrogate's court until that sixty days (under §211-c) had
expired. This avoids a multiplicity of proceedings; the entertaining
of the section 211-b petition before the sixty days had lapsed would
not prevent the claimant from proceeding in another court under
section 211-c within the sixty days. Thus, the court held that it
would entertain the petition only after the running of the sixty
days (provided, of course, that the claimant had not commenced
an action at law or equity during that period).

31s 43 Misc. 2d 106, 250 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Surr. Ct. 1964).

